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Abstract
This article examines the structure of gender and ethnic wage gaps and the distribution
of both paid and unpaid work in LAC countries. Its main contribution is to expose the
double discrimination endured by women in the region. Indeed, the results indicate
that women are highly discriminated in the job market and undertake most of the
domestic activities in the household, allocating in average 40 hours per week to paid
market activities and another 40 hours to in-home unpaid activities. The indigenous
population also suffers from discrimination, but the wage gap is mainly explained by
the difference in endowments, highlighting their limited access to education and their
concentration in rural areas. The wage quantile decomposition results suggest the
presence of sticky floor effects for both women and indigenous workers.
JEL codes: J22; J31; J71
Keywords: Inequality; Ethnicity; Gender; Time-use
1 Introduction
Two important factors are generally associated with gender and ethnic discrimination in
Latin America: the low level of human capital and the strength of social norms. The first
one is usually captured by educational attainment and years of work experience. In Latin
America, the average years of schooling is 8 which is relatively low compared to Europe
and more advanced countries. Needless to say that ethnic minorities are the most disad-
vantaged in this respect. Concentrated mainly in rural areas their access to education and
health services is precarious and limited. Moreover, occupational segregation is partic-
ularly high. Indigenous workers are mostly found in low-productivity activities either in
the agricultural, manufacturing, and construction sectors or in domestic service.
The strength of social norms is particularly evident in the strict gender division of labor
in the region. In line with traditional gender roles, women are mainly responsible for
domestic activities and for looking after children, even though their participation in the
labor market has increased over time, and men are perceived as breadwinners working
primarily in outside-home activities. These gender stereotypes are culturally acceptable
in most Latin American countries and little has been done to change them. Women in
the region face premarket discrimination and exclusion in the labor market and they are
double burned taking most of the housework in the household.
Ethnic and gender disparities have two main consequences in the job market. The first
one is the existence of significant entry barriers to the formal job market and the second
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one, is that even when these barriers are crossed, there is still a wage gap between the
discriminated group and the non discriminated one. A priori, this wage differential could
lead to a smaller labor force participation from the discriminated group, increasing the
demand for domestic production on in-home activities. In this context, women may have
a bigger incentive to stay at home and accomplish domestic tasks rather than participating
in the labormarket, especially when the wage differential is significant. But to what extend
does the level of wages really influence the distribution of domestic activities within a
couple?
The literature on gender and ethnic inequality is enormous, but much of the research
focuses on wage differences neglecting the importance of domestic labor and time use. In
this article, we examine the gender and ethnic gaps in wages and in the allocation of time
to paid and unpaid work in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala. We pay particular atten-
tion to the role of education in explaining and reducing the gap along the wage and time
distributions. The low level of human capital in the region is an important factor that
determines women’s expected social role in domestic activities and it certainly plays a sig-
nificant part in the inequality of opportunities endured by ethnic minorities and women
in these countries. Needless to say that human capital and social norms are highly corre-
lated. Education, for instance, helps individuals changing existing norms by influencing
their perceptions and behavior.
In order to assess the importance and determinants of the wage gap between the
discriminated group and those who are not, we use the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position (BO decomposition, hereafter) and complete the analysis with a quantile decom-
position method proposed by Firpo et al. (2009). In order to explain the determinants of
weekly allocation of time between domestic and paid market activities, while taking into
account the inter-dependance of decision-making process inside the household, we use
seemingly unrelated regressions.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical framework.
Section 3 provides a literature review. Section 4 introduces the econometricmethodology.
Section 5 describes the data, and Section 6 presents the results and concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In a broader sense, discrimination is defined as the unjustified difference in treatment
between two distinct groups of the population based on cultural or physical characteris-
tics such as gender, age, race, religion, or political views. In the labor market it is usually
measured in terms of wage differentials between workers, the degree of segregation in
different types of employment or sectors, and labor force participation, see Cain (1987)
and Altonji and Blank (1999).
Neoclassical theory of discrimination is divided in two classes of models: competitive
and collective models. In collective models, as its name indicates, groups act collectively
against each other, while competitive models focus on individual behavior. Competitive
models are further divided in taste-based models with complete information and statisti-
cal models of discrimination with imperfect information. The former one is the primary
interest of this article since it is the model introduced by Becker (1957), which gives the
theoretical framework for the well known and widely used BO decomposition.
The main drawback of these models is that pre-market discrimination is not taken into
account. Differences in endowments are certainly explained by the environment in which
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each individual evolves. For instance, immigrants families usually live in sectors where
criminality rates are high, integration with country natives is limited, and education is of
low quality. In this context, the probability that children from immigrated families attend
to college may be significantly reduced. Therefore, in average, these children have a clear
disadvantage compare to those who have had access to a good education and have grown
up far from violence and criminality.
Discrimination in the labor market is an open, pervasive, and persistent phenomenon
as many of the empirical works have shown. But discrimination or disparities also exist
inside the households. The gender differences in the allocation of time to housework and
labor market activities is a recognized fact. Indeed, it is known that women spend more
time in housework activities compared tomen. It is more questionable why this is the case.
In order to explain the differences in time allocation three main theories have been pro-
posed: The time availability hypothesis, the relative resource hypothesis, and the gender
hypothesis. The time availability hypothesis argues that time spend on domestic chores is
related to the amount of time available for each family member, thus there is an inverse
correlation between the hours spend in market labor activities and the hours spend in
domestic task, see Hiller (1984) and Coverman (1985). The relative resources perspective
suggests that the amount of hours spend on household chores depends on the bargain-
ing power of each partner, so that the member of the couple with the bigger bargaining
power imposes his own housework preference on the other one, see Brines (1994). The
gender hypothesis explains that the amount of housework done by women is bigger than
those of men simply because the society automatically links housework and gender. This
perspective highlights that there is no a real trade off between labor market activities and
housework, since all the housework is dictated to women by the social norm, see Bianchi
et al. (2000).
2.1 Amodel of allocation of time
Following Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987), the husbandm and the wife f of a household h
maximize the utility u represented by the function:
u = U(xm, xf , cm, cf , lm, lf ), (1)
subject to time and monetary constraints:
lm + cm + hm = Tm, (2)
lf + cf + hf = Tf , (3)
p(xm + xf ) = wmhm + wf hf + vh, (4)
where xi is the consumption of market goods, ci the housework time, li the leisure time,
hi the labor market hours, wi the net wage rates, p the market price of goods xi, vh other
non-labor income of the household, and Ti fixed time endowments, with i ∈ {m, f }.
Combining the two constrains, under the assumption of perfect substitutability of time
between activities, yields the full income constraint:
p(xm + xf ) + wm(lm + cm) + wf (lf + cf ) = wmTm + wf Tf + vh ≡ Y , (5)
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Solving this maximization problem yields solutions for xi, ci, li, hi (endogenous variables
of the model) as function of the exogenous variables wi, Ti, vh, and Zh.
qk = fk(wm,wf ,Tm,Tf , vh,Zh), (6)
with
qk ⊆ (xm, xf , cm, cf , lm, lf , hm, hf ), (7)
where Zh is the other exogenous variables affecting the utility, such as household’s
demographic characteristics.
3 Literature review
Empirical evidence on wage disparities is extensive. Results are well established, women
and gender minorities are discriminated in the labor market with different degrees across
countries. Among the works that use Latin America data we find those by Tenjo et al.
(2005), who analyze the evolution of the gender gap in six LAC countries and find
evidence of statistical discrimination. Ñopo (2012) finds that gender and ethnic earn-
ings gaps persist in the region, even though the situation of these groups in the labor
market and the society in general has improved over time. Finally, Popli (2013) uses a
nonparametric-distributional approach to study gender wage differentials and finds evi-
dence of a reduction of labor market discrimination against women due to a diminishing
discrimination at the lower tail of the wage distribution.
Regarding the differences in the allocation of time to domestic and market activities,
it has been shown that there is an important inequality in the time spend in housework
activities between men and women, see Wales and Woodland (1977), Sousa-Poza et al.
(2001), and Álvarez and Miles (2003). Indeed, women tend to spend more time doing
household chores compared to men and men spend more time in paid work activities.
Articles studying the determinants of the allocation of time in Latin American countries
are limited, probably because of the scarcity of Time Use surveys in the region. Some of
the few works found in the literature are those of Newman (2002) who uses survey data
from Ecuador to examine the effects of women’s employment on the allocation of paid and
unpaid labor within the household. She finds that women’s labor market opportunities
have no effect on women’s total time in paid labor but they increase men’s time in unpaid
labor, which in turn reflects women’s increased bargaining power at home. Medeiros
et al. (2007) analyze paid and unpaid work-time inequalities among Bolivian urban adults.
They find that gender is an important variable to explain howmuch paid and unpaid work
is done by individuals, but not so important to explain why some people have a higher
total workload than others.
4 Methodology
4.1 The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
The standard approach for the study of earnings differentials was introduced in the eco-
nomics literature by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). From the estimation of wage
equations this method allows us to decompose the mean wage difference between two
groups into three effects: the “Endowments effect”, that amounts to the part of the dif-
ferential due to group differences in the vector of characteristics; the “Coefficient effect”,
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that corresponds to the differences in the coefficients; and the “Interaction effect”, that
accounts for the simultaneous existence of differences in endowments and coefficients.
In the original BO decomposition, one has to choose the reference group for the coun-
terfactual. For instance, in assessing the potential wage of women in absence of discrimi-
nation, one usually assumes that the male wage structure provides a good counterfactual,
but this is not always the case. Reimers (1983), Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom
(1994) suggest different alternatives for a new wage structure that can be used instead.
One popular application is to calculate β∗ (the estimated non-discriminatory earning
structure) from a pooled regression over both groups, with the inclusion of a dummy
variable as group indicator in order to avoid the transfer of parts of the unexplained com-
ponent into the explained one, see Jann (2008). This is the procedure used in this article
for the Oaxaca decomposition as well as for the Firpo et al. (2009) decomposition.
Concerning the wage equation, the usual regression model is based on the “human cap-
ital specification”, but recent approaches additionally control for occupation and industry
in order to reduce the error term and to take into account occupational segregation.
As pointed out by Blau and Kahn (2000) any approach that relies on a statistical resid-
ual is open to questions regarding the inclusion of all necessary independent variables
in the regression. Unobserved factors such as ability can overstate the size of the unex-
plained part of the wage gap. On the other hand, the inclusion of economic sectors and
worker occupation may understate the part attributed to discrimination if occupational
segregation is the result of discriminatory practices in the labor market.
4.2 The RIF regression
Decomposition methods for parameters other than the mean face econometric compli-
cations since the law of iterated expectations does not hold for them. Various methods to
overcome this problem have been proposed. Among them, themost popular are the resid-
ual imputation method by Juhn et al. (1993), the conditional quantile regression method
by Mata and Machado (2005) and Melly (2005), and the RIF regression method by Firpo
et al. (2009). In this article we use the latter one since it allows us to compute the effect
of each covariate on the unconditional wage distribution, and it is also less computational
demanding than those proposed by Mata and Machado (2005) and Melly (2005).
A detailed explanation for the method used here and for all the other decomposition
methods cited above, can be found in Firpo et al. (2010). In the following we give a short
overview of the RIF-regression method.
Let Y be the output variable, in our case wages, and υ(FY ) the distributional statistic of
interest, in our case quintiles. The influence function IF(y; υ) of υ at the observed wage y
is given by:
IF(Y ,Qτ ) = τ − 1 {Y ≤ Qτ }fY (Qτ ) , (8)
where τ represents the quantile of interest, 1{·} is an indicator function expressing
whether the outcome variable is smaller or equal to the quantile, and fY (·) is the den-
sity of the marginal distribution on Y evaluated at the population τ -quantile of the
unconditional distribution of Y.
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Since the recentered influence function is defined as RIF(y; υ) = υ(FY ) + IF(y; υ), for
the quantile case it is written as:
RIF(Y ,Qτ ) = Qτ + τ − 1{Y ≤ Qτ }fY (Qτ ) . (9)
After computing the RIF, usually by kernel methods, it replaces the outcome variable
in the regression over the covariates. The RIF regression is carried out in a standard OLS
framework. Once this has been done, the estimated coefficients are used to perform a
detailed decomposition in the same spirit of the classical Blinder-Oaxaca methodology.
4.3 Seemingly unrelated regressions
Theoretical models suggest that both spouses’ decision of time allocation between house-
work hours and labor market activities are determined simultaneously. In order to take
into account the inter-dependance of the decision-making process, we use seemingly
unrelated regressions. The reduced equations based on the (Kooreman and Kapteyn
1987) model explained above, leads to the following estimation specification:
hm = αwm + βwf + γjZmj + θkZhk + m, (10)
cm = αwm + βwf + γjZmj + θkZhk + m, (11)
hf = αwm + βwf + γjZfj + θkZhk + f , (12)
cf = αwm + βwf + γjZfj + θkZhk + f , (13)
where Zm and Zf includes all the individual characteristics j ∈ {1, . . . , n} that affect
labor and domestic activities, Zh all the other household demographic characteristics
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and i is the regression residual, with i ∈ {m, f }.
A usual problem that we face with the above estimation, is the presence of zero obser-
vations. This is a common characteristic of time use data and there are two possible
explanations: either the individual in question does not participate in domestic activities
at all, or the individual usually participates but for some reason he/she did not do it during
the recording period. Since one cannot differentiate one from the other, this fact needs
to be taken into account during the estimation. Common procedures include the Tobit
and the Heckman selection model. The choice of the model depends on the results of the
normality and homoskedasticity tests, hypothesis that our results reject1. In this article
we use the Heckman two stages procedure for men’s time allocation in domestic activi-
ties. Since the proportion of women that shows zero observations for housework activities
correspond, in average, to 1% of each country sample, there is no need to perform this
procedure for them.
4.4 Selectivity issues
This article does not address selection into the jobmarket when estimating wage differen-
tials at quantile levels. The reasons are as follows: First, we are interested in studying wage
disparities conditional on being employed. Second, selection bias correction in a quantile
framework requires techniques that are less developed, with just few studies addressing
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the problem. These studies, in turn, rely on the validity of instruments and the correct
identification of the intercept of the wage equation2.
The second problem concerns the time equations. Since for the second part of the study,
we use a sample of couples where both individuals work, it is easy to imagine that women
who are working in the labor market, especially when their husbands are also working,
are very positively selected. We correct this problem using the Heckman selection model
for the equation corresponding to the hours allocated to paid market activities by women.
The other two equations are performed by OLS, and the whole system is estimated as
seemingly unrelated regressions. The errors are corrected using a standard bootstrap
procedure with 1200 replications.
5 Data
The vast majority of indigenous people in Latin America lives in Bolivia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. Altogether, the five countries, account for almost 90 per
cent of the indigenous population in the region. Due to data limitations, we carry out the
analysis using data from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala, but it would be ideal to do it
for all of them.
The analysis in this paper draws on individual level data from the Bolivian National
Living Standards Survey (MECOVI ) 2001 conducted by the Bolivian National Institute of
Statistics (INE), the Ecuadorian Survey of Employment and Unemployment (ENEMDU)
2007 conducted by the Ecuadorian National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC),
and the Guatemalan National Living Standards Survey (ENCOVI) 2000 conducted by the
Guatemalan National Institute of Statistics (INE).
For the three countries, individuals answered questions regarding ethnic background,
income, and time use on domestic activities. Information on wages, transfers, and
other non labor income was collected, as well as common socio-demographic char-
acteristics such as level of education, age, gender, marital status, area of residence,
etc.
From the initial sample we selected working individuals aged between 20 and 70 years,
living in nuclear families, either in couple or alone. Descriptive statistics of the final
sample are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (whole sample)
Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala
Variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Income per capita 889.29 (897.40) 240.23 (234.30) 7153.08 (7976)
Household size 4.34 (2.06) 3.89 (1.70) 4.97 (2.13)
Age 39.86 (11.77) 42.59 (11.77) 39.34 (11.65)
Male 0.63 (0.48) 0.65 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46)
Indigenous 0.63 (0.48) 0.07 (0.26) 0.35 (0.47)
Urban households 0.53 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50)
Primary education 0.55 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.75 (0.43)
Secondary education 0.31 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.19 (0.39)
Tertiary education 0.14 (0.34) 0.19 (0.39) 0.06 (0.23)
Observations 5617 - 12046 - 4492 -
Note.- Income data is shown in local currency, Peso Boliviano, American Dollar, Quetzales.
Income: sum of wages/salaries, net income from self-employment, and other non labor income.
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The set of explanatory variables in the wage equations includes a constant, age, edu-
cation (primary, secondary, and higher), occupational tenure, area of residence, region,
social security, industry of employment constructed using the International Standard
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) published by UN, and occupa-
tion using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) published by
the ILO.
Working individuals are defined as those reporting positive hours and earnings.
Wages are computed using the labor income from the primary occupation. Earn-
ings are reported in several frequencies (daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, quarterly,
semester, and annual). We standardize the data to a weekly frequency. Hourly wages
are obtained by dividing wages by the number of hours worked. Indigenous peo-
ple are identified using the “self-identification” variable available in the three sur-
veys. Note however, that using the variable “spoken language at home” yields sim-
ilar results. Table 2 shows labor market indicators for the whole sample and by
subpopulations.
For the second part of the study, following the theoretical model, the paper considers
a restricted dataset consisting on couples where both individuals work. This allows us to
specifically address the unequal distribution of domestic activities within Latin American
two-earner couples, that is, to compare spouses in similar conditions. Moreover, one of
the main objectives of the paper is to test whether or not the wage received by women acts
as a bargaining tool for the decision process inside the household. From a policy perspec-
tive, if this is the case, improving women’s conditions on the labor market by reducing
the wage gap can also have a positive equalizing effect, through the level of wages, in
housework shares. So, in line with the first part of the study, we focus on labor and
domestic inequalities conditional on being employed. Hence, our restricted sample con-
sists of 651 working couples for Bolivia, 2,097 couples for Ecuador, and 363 couples for
Guatemala.
Table 2 Labor market indicators
Total Ethnic origin Gender Indigenous Non-Indigenous
Variables All Indigenous Non-Indig Male Female Male Female Male Female
Bolivia
Working hours 43.93 43.82 44.12 47.06 37.40 46.38 38.09 48.11 36.33
Hourly wage 5.94 5.12 7.33 5.80 6.23 5.01 5.37 7.21 7.56
Labor force 78.83 80.26 76.50 96.02 57.07 96.02 58.68 96.02 54.73
participation rate
Ecuador
Working hours 42.20 39.92 42.38 45.30 36.48 42.05 35.79 45.56 36.53
Hourly wage 1.38 0.93 1.42 1.43 1.30 0.97 0.84 1.47 1.34
Labor force 86.92 74.44 88.09 96.24 73.73 95.29 52.32 96.32 76.11
participation rate
Guatemala
Working hours 43.67 41.25 44.98 47.83 33.83 45.38 29.70 49.26 35.70
Hourly wage 7.24 5.48 8.198 7.29 7.11 5.65 5.01 8.25 8.07
Labor force 50.89 46.66 53.52 73.38 29.52 68.39 24.73 76.64 32.36
participation rate
Notes.- Sample: individuals aged between 20 and 70 years living in nuclear families.
Wages are shown in local currency, Peso Boliviano, American Dollar, Quetzales.
Labor force participation rate: number of working individuals divided by the number of people in the sample.
2014, 3:18
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Note that by studying three countries with marked differences in welfare, educational
attainment, geography, and ethnic composition, may be helpful in identifying, indirectly,
the effect of stereotypes and social norms on the intra-household allocation of time.
The set of explanatory variables in the time equations includes a constant, hus-
band’s wage, wife’s wage, age, age squared, educational attainment, area of residence,
dummy variables indicating whether the individual is indigenous, if there are kids in the
household, and the presence of female kids over 12.
6 Results
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the weekly hours spent on domestic and paid
market activities for the male, female, indigenous, and non-indigenous population of
the sample. A quick glance at the table tells us that in average people devote twice as
much time to paid labor activities than to domestic activities. In general, men spend
more time in the job market compared to women, but women spend in average four
times more hours performing domestic tasks than men. Women dedicate almost the
same amount of time in domestic chores than in the paid market activities (around 35
hours for each of them). In fact, women are double burdened and tend to accumu-
late both types of work, while men concentrate only on paid market work. Concerning
the indigenous population, they spend similar amount of hours doing domestic activi-
ties than the rest of the population, but spend around 3 hours less in the paid market
activities.
The large differential between the numbers of hours spent on domestic activi-
ties for men and women may be driven by lower wages for women in the paid
market activities compared to men, pushing them to carry out most of the house-
work activities. The bigger the wage gap, the larger the incentive for women to
stay at home. In order to test this assumption we study the determinants of
the allocation of time and look for the magnitude and significance of the wage
coefficients.
6.1 Wage gap decompositions
The results of the BO decomposition are shown in Table 4. As explained in Section 4,
the decomposition method divides the wage gap into two components: the explained
component, which is the part of the gap that is attributed to the difference of endow-
ments between the discriminated population and those who are not, and the unexplained
Table 3 Descriptive statistics: time allocation
Bolivia Whole sample Male Female Indigenous Non-indigenous
Domestic work 17.735 10.351 33.459 17.391 18.322
Market work 43.939 47.006 37.407 43.827 44.129
Ecuador Whole sample Male Female Indigenous Non-indigenous
Domestic work 19.902 11.148 36.079 20.247 19.875
Market work 42.206 45.304 36.480 39.920 42.386
Guatemala Whole sample Male Female Indigenous Non-indigenous
Domestic work 19.725 9.259 33.833 20.624 19.237
Market work 43.672 47.837 44.45 41.252 44.987
Note.-Average hours per week, working individuals.
2014, 3:18
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Table 4 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala
Variables Ethnic Gender Gender† Ethnic Gender Gender† Ethnic Gender Gender†
Total Gap 0.538*** -0.062 -0.012 0.426*** 0.167*** 0.136*** 0.408*** 0.085** 0.171**
Explained 0.365*** -0.279*** -0.281*** 0.282*** -0.082*** -0.078*** 0.256*** -0.127*** 0.191***
Unexplained 0.174*** 0.216*** 0.268*** 0.144*** 0.248*** 0.214*** 0.152*** 0.212*** -0.019
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
†Corrected for selectivity.
component, which is the difference on the wage usually attributed to discrimination. As
a reference, Table 4 also includes the gender results based on the Heckman selection
correction.
The case of Bolivia, is of particular interest, since the wage gap seems to be in favor
of women (significant at 10% level). A couple of reasons can explain these results. First,
the lower labor market participation of Bolivian women with respect to men. Either for
self-selection out of the job market or because the entry barriers are stronger. Second,
ethnic discrimination is significant in a country where the majority of the population is
indigenous, so average wages of men along the distribution may be pulled down due to
the important presence of male indigenous workers.
The Oaxaca decomposition also shows that, in average, the explained effect accounts
for the biggest proportion of the wage gap between indigenous and non-indigenous work-
ers. Indeed, even if indigenous workers are also discriminated in the job market, the
difference in wages is mainly driven by the difference of endowments. This fact highlights
the importance of public policies conceived to improve educational attainment in these
countries.
Table 5 shows the decomposition of the gender and ethnic wage gap at different points
of the distribution. In general, the wage gap is wider at the lower tail of the distribution for
both the gender and ethnic perspective, suggesting the presence of a “sticky floor” effect.
The RIF method allows to analyze the contribution of each explanatory variable
to the endowment and coefficient effects3. Along with the human capital specifica-
tion, we have also controlled for economic sector and occupation. As pointed out in
Section 3, results must be interpreted carefully since if occupational segregation is
due to discriminatory practices in the labor market, it will understate the measure of
discrimination.
For the case of Ecuador, we notice that the gender wage gap is primarily due to the
effects on the coefficients, while the ethnic wage gap is due to differences in endowments
or characteristics. An important point is that the explained part of the gender gap is nega-
tive through all different quantiles of the distribution (this is true for the three countries).
This pattern is increasing and suggest that women in our sample have better endowments
than men, specially at the upper part of the wage distribution.
Looking at the detailed decomposition, one can see that tertiary education accounts
for approximately one third of the explained component for the higher quantiles. Indeed,
women advantages in terms of education and job related characteristics, at the top of the
distribution, offset almost the totality of the unexplained part, reducing significantly the
total wage gap in that part of the distribution. Moreover, around 50% of the coefficients














Table 5 RIF- OLS Regressions
Gender wage gap Ethnic wage gap
Quantile 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Bolivia
Difference -0.139 -0.013 0.003 -0.045 -0.045 0.991*** 0.669*** 0.425*** 0.335*** 0.330***
Explained -0.439*** -0.407*** -0.177*** -0.106*** -0.109** 0.655*** 0.517*** 0.309*** 0.240*** 0.177***
Unexplained 0.300*** 0.394*** 0.180*** 0.061 0.064 0.336** 0.152** 0.116** 0.095* 0.153*
Ecuador
Difference 0.340*** 0.268*** 0.191*** 0.068** 0.033 0.582*** 0.464*** 0.343*** 0.335*** 0.485***
Explained -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.078*** -0.117*** -0.114*** 0.440*** 0.294*** 0.290*** 0.348*** 0.289***
Unexplained 0.403*** 0.328*** 0.270*** 0.186*** 0.147*** 0.142* 0.170*** 0.053 -0.013 0.196***
Guatemala
Difference 0.234*** 0.171*** 0.109** –0.008 –0.042 0.319*** 0.377*** 0.463*** 0 .515*** 0.496***
Explained –0.162*** –0.123*** –0.125*** –0.141*** –0.180*** 0.151*** 0 .221*** 0.312*** 0.331*** 0.309***








Canelas and Salazar IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 12 of 15
women perceive with respect to men, implying that even when women in our sample are
more qualified than men in terms of education, possibly due to a strong selection into the
job market, they still perceive lower wages.
Regarding the ethnic wage gap, we see that the explained part accounts for a bit more
than half of the gap at the lower and upper quantiles, and almost the totality of the gap
at the median and the 0.7 quantile, implying that ethnic discrimination is stronger at the
extremes of the distribution.
The ethnic wage gap in the Bolivian case is of particular interest since more than 60%
of the population is indigenous. The gap is mainly driven by differences in endowments,
but the distance between the explained and unexplained components at the upper part of
the distribution is extremely small.
The Guatemalan case is outstanding to the extent that both, gender and ethnic wage
gaps are important. The ethnic wage gap is primarily driven by the endowments effect
from the median and upper quantiles, but at the lower quantile the coefficients effect
represents more than half of the wage gap. Difference in education and working in the
agricultural sector contribute to more than half of the endowments effect for the upper
tail of the distribution, but being a skilled agricultural worker, the absence of social secu-
rity, and living in the urban areas is what explains the endowments effect at the lower
quintiles.
As for the case of Bolivia, the wage gap at the upper part of the distribution seems to
be in favor of women. This can also be explained by a strong positive selection of women
into the job market.
Overall, the wage gap is bigger at the lower tail of the distribution, for both women
and indigenous population, suggesting a sticky floor effect. In all three countries educa-
tion and living in the urban areas constitute a large portion of the endowments effect
of the ethnic wage gap, which suggest that indigenous population have limited access to
education and are concentrated in rural areas with a limited access to the job market.
6.2 The determinants of the allocation of time
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates of the seemingly unrelated regressions of weekly
hours of work spend on labor market and domestic activities for selected variables4. The
results concern only gender differences in housework shares, since the intra-household
allocation of time to domestic activities does not seem to depend on ethnic origin.
From the regression on the number of hours spent in paid market activities, one can see
that the bigger determinants of weekly paid working hours are wage and living in urban
areas. Among them, only the area of residence increases the hours spend in the labor mar-
ket for both men and women in all three countries, what suggests that demand for labor is
still higher in bigger cities. The impact is more evident in Bolivia, where men’s coefficient
is multiplied by 2 compared to Ecuador and Guatemala. The significant negative impact
of the person’s ethnic origin in Guatemala, reflects the restricted access of the indigenous
population to labor markets. The effect is stronger for female indigenous workers who in
average work 10 hours less in paid marked activities than the rest of the population.
Regarding the results from the regression of the number of hours per week spent on
domestic activities, one can see that tertiary education, in Bolivia and Ecuador, decreases
the time that women spend on domestic activities. This is important since the level of
education in the three countries is very low. As it has been pointed out in the wage
2014, 3:18
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Table 6 SUR (Couples)
Male paid work Female paid work Male housework Female housework
Bolivia
Tertiary education -3.141 -2.591 2.577 -5.086*
Female wage 0.248 -9.141*** 0.252 -0.106
Male wage -7.979*** -1.213 -0.034 -0.539
Female child +12 - - -0.733 -0.827
Ecuador
Tertiary education 1.602 6.322*** 2.249 -3.328*
Female wage 0.104 -5.182*** 0.386 -0.967
Male wage -4.041*** -0.497 0.036 0.927
Female child +12 - - -0.454 -4.366***
Guatemala
Tertiary education –6.870* -4.314 -2.355 2.297
Female wage 2.723* -8.946*** 3.338* 4.276
Male wage -8.684*** 2.424 -1.305 -1.980
Female child +12 - - -1.702 -7.320*
All dependent variables are in weekly hours.
Bootstrapped standard errors.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
decomposition results, education explains a significant part of the wage gap, in particular
for the indigenous population. It also reduces the gap in the upper quantiles, especially
for women. In this context, investing in women’s education becomes an effective tool
for reducing gender and ethnic inequalities in the labor markets and inside the house-
hold, considering that Bolivia and Guatemala have an important proportion of indigenous
population.
Concerning labor earnings, we observe that wages have no effect on unpaid work activi-
ties neither for women nor for men, except for Guatemala where the wife’s wage increases
by 3 hours per week the participation of men to domestic tasks. This suggest that social
norms play a significant role in the allocation of time to domestic activities. Once again,
the importance of increasing the level of education of the population becomes evident;
education helps individuals changing existing norms by influencing their perceptions and
behavior.
Finally, it is interesting to see how the presence of a female child over 12 years old,
reduces the female’s housework time in Guatemala and Ecuador, suggesting that young
female children help their mothers with domestic tasks. The rest of the variables present
different signs and magnitudes among the countries. Their effects can be attributed to
cultural differences and respective development levels.
6.3 Robustness checks
First, we re-estimate Equations 10 to 13 without correcting for women’s selection in the
labor market. These estimates, available from the authors upon request, remain statisti-
cally significant and with similar magnitude to the previous estimates (Table 6). Thus, the
main conclusion from before -that wages do not affect the housework shares- is maintained.
Second, we re-estimate Equations 10 to 13 allowing for corner solutions, that is, we
do not restrict the sample to couples in which both husbands and wives work and so,
the unrestricted dataset also considers individuals that recorded zero hours of work or
domestic activities during the week. This indeed change the magnitude of the coefficients
2014, 3:18
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of interest by 1 to 2 hours per week, but the sign and significance level remain the same.
Except for Bolivia, where women’s tertiary education reduces the time allocated to domes-
tic activities by 12 hours per week. These estimates, reinforce the principal finding that
housework shares are not determined by economic variables such as the level of wages.
Instead, the allocation of time to domestic activities is due, to a large extend, to gender
identities and the strength of social norms in each country.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies gender and ethnic disparities in paid and unpaid work in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Guatemala. Overall, the results suggest that ethnic disparities are more
clearly reflected in wage differences on the labor market, while gender disparities can be
found in both the labor market and the allocation of time to domestic activities within the
household.
After decomposing labor earning differences, we found that in the three countries,
indigenous workers are paid less than non-indigenous workers and that nearly half of the
wage gap is explained by differences in human capital endowments. These results high-
light the limited access to education and the concentration in rural areas of the indigenous
population.
Gender disparities in the labor market are also important, but the wage gap is signifi-
cantly reduced by the differences in endowments, suggesting a strong positive selection
of women in the labor market.
Finally, in the case of two-earner couples, the results are consistent with the idea that
differences on housework allocation of time are mainly due to gender identities.
From a policy perspective, the results emphasize the importance of education as a tool
to reduce on the one side ethnic disparities due to the difference in endowments and on
the other side gender disparities in the labor market and housework allocation.
Clearly, as any analysis based on a statistical residual, the results present some limita-
tions since some unmeasured characteristics such as productivity could also explain the
observed unequal allocation of time to domestic activities. Nevertheless, the results raise
some interesting questions regarding the strength of stereotypes and social norms in the
region. In all three countries, men’s time allocation to unpaid housework activities is, to a
large extent, invariant to changes in the level of wages. This suggest that policies directed
to empower women through economic factors can only be effective if they are complemented
with equalizing policies aiming to modify the perception of women’s role in the society.
Endnotes
1The test procedures are detailed in Cameron and Trivedi (2009). Results are available
from authors upon request.
2See the works of Buchinsky (1998), Albrecht et al. (2009), and Chzhen et al. (2012)
3The results of the detailed decomposition are shown in Additional file 1: Appendix.
Tables S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 and S6.
4Complete estimations are available from the authors upon request.
Additional file
: Appendix. Table S1. Bolivia, RIF-OLS Regressions (Gender Wage Gap). Table S2. Bolivia, RIF- OLS
Regressions. Table S3. Ecuador, RIF- OLS Regressions (Gender Wage Gap) (Ethnic Wage Gap). Table S4. Ecuador,
RIF- OLS Regressions (Ethnic Wage Gap). Table S5. Guatemala, RIF- OLS Regressions (Gender Wage Gap).
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